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The architects of the global war on terror have been collectively engaged in drawing a line under 
the legacy of past torture.
1
 They are attempting to rebuild the trust lost as a result of the 
willingness to ignore or otherwise evade global human rights commitments in the pursuit of 
“exceptional” security objectives.2 This conceit that abuses can be bracketed off rests on three 
key claims: first, the historical legacy of abuse is being actively and openly confronted; second, 
that current counterterrorism policy and practice complies with international human rights 
standards; and third, these measures can together contain and remedy any damage done to the 
standing of fundamental human rights norms as a result of past practice. This article asks 
whether the current strategy for reconciling human rights and security imperatives achieves its 
purpose. Do current efforts to manage the tensions between security and human rights avoid the 
exceptionalism that defined the Bush-era war on terror? Has the damage done to the practical 
standing of key human rights norms been contained? Or do past abuses in the war on terror 
continue to cast a shadow on counterterrorism policy formation?  
 These questions are explored through an analysis of the role that diplomatic assurances 
(DAs) play in global counterterrorism. Diplomatic assurances are promises that those subject to 
extradition or deportation proceeding will have their basic human rights protected. Because of 
their putative ability to manage the tensions between security and human rights, particularly the 
obligations created by the principle of non-refoulement and the desire to expel terrorists or 
                                               
* This article benefitted enormously from the reviewers’ suggestions and from the difficult questions asked by Ruth 
Blakeley, Frank Foley and Andrea Birdsall as part of the BISA panel ‘Torture and Human Rights in the War on 
Terror’; I would also like to thank Mark Kersten for the opportunity to give some of the ideas explored here a 
preliminary airing at justiceinconflict.org. 
1
 See for example, ‘Remarks by the President at the National Defense University’, 23 May 2013, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university, accessed 28 
August 2014; see also speech by the ex-head of MI6 Sir John Sawers, 28 October 2010, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/28/sir-john-sawers-speech-full-text; more generally, see Trevor 
McCrisken, ‘Ten years on: Obama's war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice’, International Affairs 87:4 July 2011, 
pp. 781–801; Benjamin Wittes (ed.), Legislating the war on terror: an agenda for reform (Washington DC: 
Brooking, 2009), p. 1-3. 
2
 On exceptionalism see especially Philippe Sands, Lawless world: making and breaking global 
 rules (London: Penguin, 2006); Jason Ralph, America's war on terror: the state of the 9/11 exception from Bush to 
Obama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); on the importance of trust in the war on terror see especially Cian 
O’Driscoll, ‘Fear and Trust: The Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and the War on Terror’, Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 36:2, April 2008, 339-360. 
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suspected terrorists, diplomatic assurances have become an increasingly important tool.
3
 This 
article first details how diplomatic assurances function to manage the tensions in this area and 
respond to the legacy of the war on terror before assessing why and where human rights 
advocates have been pushing back against their use. This article argues that the opposition to 
diplomatic assurances reveals how the challenge of reconciling human rights with security has 
migrated from a battle over illegality and exceptionalism and towards a concern with whether 
counterterrorism policymakers can be trusted to progressively develop the global rules governing 
this domain.
4
 Understanding why human rights advocates continue to oppose what might 
otherwise seem to be good faith attempts to improve the law in this domain is a preliminary step 
towards a stronger, more stable anti-torture regime.    
  
Non-refoulement and Diplomatic Assurances 
  
The principle of non-refoulement is a key element of the global anti-torture regime and 
international refugee law. Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture defines it as follows: 
  
1.No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another state 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, 
the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights. 
  
There is a general agreement that non-refoulement inherits the same non-derogable, jus cogens 
character as the core prohibition against torture.
5 
However, because it invites a judgement by the 
‘competent authorities’, there is much greater room for debate and dissensus over the practical 
                                               
3
 Ashley S. Deeks, Avoiding transfers to torture  (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2008), available 
at: http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Assurances_CSR35.pdf 
4
 “Trust” has become an increasingly important concept in international relations scholarship; it is important to be 
aware of the different ways in which trust matter for diplomatic assurances – as statements of confidence in a 
receiving country, as a component of intelligence relationships (e.g. information sharing; the exclusionary rule) 
which needs to be protected, and as a more general condition or characterisation of the capacity to exercise authority 
(trusteeship). See variously Aaron M. Hoffman, ‘A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations 8:3, September 2002, pp. 375–401; Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002); Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Brian C. Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International 
Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics 
(London: Palgrave, 2007); Cian O’Driscoll, ‘Fear and Trust’; Torsten Michel, ‘Time to get emotional: Phronetic 
reflections on the concept of trust in International Relations,’ European Journal of International Relations 19:4, 
December 2013, pp. 869-890; Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Investigating diplomatic transformations,’ International Affairs 
89: 2, March 2013, pp. 477-496; more generally, see Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
5
 Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 445.  
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requirements of this commitment, including the sort of considerations that can and should be 
including in judging whether it is legal and legitimate to expel an individual to a country where 
they might be at risk of torture.
6
 Differences over how to operationalise the principle of non-
refoulement have as a result become one of the key battlegrounds in the wider debate over how 
to integrate human rights with national security. 
States have argued for the need to be allowed greater flexibility in weighing human rights 
commitments, including an individual’s risk of torture, against other possible justifications for 
expulsion, particularly  whether that individual represents a risk to national security. In Ramzy v. 
The Netherlands, which functioned as a test case for the absolutist interpretation of non-
refoulement which the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had established in an earlier 
case
7
, a range of states argued that although there was a positive obligation to protect against 
torture, this was not a limitless obligation, especially in view of the fact that the expelling state 
would not itself be subjecting the individual to torture.
8
 Because of this, any assessment of the 
actual risk to the individual must necessarily be speculative. Moreover, they argued, states had a 
right to deport aliens, to protect their citizens’ right to life, and to protect themselves from 
external threats using immigration legislation. The contention was that states were legitimately 
entitled to use their discretion in weighing the individual’s risk on return not in isolation but 
against the interests of the community as a whole.  
The reverse argument from the human rights groups intervening in that case – and which 
the Court judgement broadly reflected – was that the operative concern protected by the principle 
of non-refoulement is the risk to the individual, rather than the risk to the community at large.
9
 
Inserting security risks into the calculus of whether an individual could be rendered to a country 
where they would be at risk of torture would dilute the practical force of the anti-torture regime 
and violate existing human rights obligations.
 
National security might pose hard cases for 
policymakers but that is not in itself a good enough reason to recalibrate the way that the 
principle of non-refoulement has traditionally been interpreted and enshrined into international 
                                               
6
 See for example Ryan Goodman who argues that the Obama administration’s “official legal position and policy 
choice is that states can transfer a detainee when there’s a 49% percent likelihood that the individual will be killed or 
tortured. That standard appears to be largely out of sync with most international legal authorities”, “Forced Transfer 
of Detainees with Diplomatic Assurances Against Ill-Treatment”, 16 December 2013, available at: 
http://justsecurity.org/4657/forced-transfer-guantanamo-detainees-diplomatic-assurances/ ; see also David A. 
Martin, ‘Refining Immigration Law’s Role in Counterterrorism’, in Wittes (ed.), Legislating the War on Terror, pp. 
180-181   
7
 Chahal v. United Kingdom, ECHR judgment of 23 October 1996, para. 80.    
8
 A (Ramzy) v. The Netherlands,  ECHR judgment of 29 June 2010. 
9
 A (Ramzy) v. The Netherlands,  ECHR judgment of 29 June 2010; see also Saadi v. Italy, ECHR judgement of 28 
February 2008, para. 139: ‘The Court considers that the argument based on the balancing of the risk of harm if the 
person is sent back against the dangerousness he or she represents to the community if not sent back is 
misconceived. The concepts of “risk” and “dangerousness” in this context do not lend themselves to a balancing test 
because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other. Either the evidence adduced before 
the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if the person is sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may 
pose a serious threat to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill-treatment 
that the person may be subject to on return. For that reason it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of 
proof, as submitted by the intervener, where the person is considered to represent a serious danger to the community, 
since assessment of the level of risk is independent of such a test.’  
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law. More important is the danger of eroding the anti-torture regime and the fact that torture 
cannot be easily remedied or undone; victims bear their scars for life.  
The use of diplomatic assurances has largely superseded these debates over whether 
security concerns can or should change the considerations that go into the calculation of the 
individual’s risk of torture. Diplomatic assurances have been defined as ‘an undertaking by the 
receiving state to the effect that the person concerned will be treated in accordance with 
conditions set by the sending State or, more generally, in keeping with its human rights 
obligations under international law’.10 Diplomatic assurances are an established part of 
international law, traditionally used to backstop the transfer of detainees to a country where they 
might otherwise face the death penalty, most commonly the United States.
11
 The idea behind 
their application to counterterrorism is that extracting a promise from states known to be, let’s 
say, less than fully compliant with their international human rights obligations can be enough to 
protect the individual from torture and so allow the returning state to meet its human rights 
obligations. The targets of such assurances in this context tend to be individuals whom the 
security services have flagged as dangerous but where detention or trial via domestic courts is 
unfeasible because of the need for operational secrecy, the need to preserve intelligence 
cooperation, or because the evidence of the individual’s involvement in terrorism has been 
tainted by torture.  
As this suggests, the key innovation of diplomatic assurances is to establish a mechanism 
by which states can legally and legitimately sidestep the question of whether there should be a 
national security component included in the calculus of risk: with DAs in place there is simply 
no need to balance the individual’s risk of torture against the security risk they pose to the state. 
It also brackets off concern about how the individual’s risk is being construed and the 
appropriate threshold of risk. Instead, diplomatic assurances provide a mechanism through which 
states are able to get rid of individuals seen to pose a continuing threat to national security while 
also accepting a conservative approach to assessing individual’s risk of torture on return.12 On 
the same basis, they have also been given a more operational role, with intelligence personnel 
and Ministers advised that they can ‘mitigate the risk of torture or CIDT [Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment] occurring through requesting and evaluating assurances on detainee 
treatment’.13 Crucial to all of this is an assumption that receiving states are trustworthy partners.  
 
                                               
10
 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International 
Refugee Protection, August 2006, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44dc81164.html, accessed 3 
September 2014.  
11
 On the history of diplomatic assurances, see especially Naureen Shah, ‘Promises to Keep: Diplomatic Assurances 
Against Torture in US Terrorism Transfers’, December 2010, pp. 56-59, available at: 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/PromisestoKeep.pdf    
12
 Jones, ‘Deportations with Assurances’, p. 185 [‘The UK's policy of DWA is a way of complying with its human 
rights obligations, not avoiding them.’] 
13
 Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of  
Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees, July 2010, p. 6, available 
at:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62632/Consolidated_Guidance_No
vember_2011.pdf   
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Trust but verify  
 
Relying on the trustworthiness of diplomatic partners raises the immediate suspicion that this 
happy state of affairs in which the commitment to non-refoulement and the prohibition on torture 
are effectively ringfenced through the use of diplomatic assurances has some gaps in it. As 
NGOs, intergovernmental bodies and indeed the UK courts have pointed out, the very fact a 
country feels the need for diplomatic assurances shows that there is a worry about the risks that 
individual would face on return.
14
 Under a strict reading of CAT Article 3 this should be enough 
to block return. Governments want to be able to argue that having an assurance in place negates 
any initial suspicion, but this rather begs the questions of how much weight a promise from a 
serial human rights abuser can carry.
15
 This worry carries particular weight when states rely on a 
very loose conception of the safeguards needed over and above a blanket promise. As Margaret 
Satterthwaite argues, President Bush’s statement that ‘We operate within the law [when] we send 
people to countries where they say they’re not going to torture the people’ was indicative of the 
way diplomatic assurances subsumed all considerations of legality in the US rendition 
programme.
16
 This led Human Rights Watch to argue that states using diplomatic assurance as a 
safeguard against torture ‘are either engaging in wishful thinking or using the assurances as a fig 
leaf to cover their complicity in torture and their role in the erosion of the international norm 
against torture’.17 In a similar vein, the late Lord Chief Justice Tom Bingham once likened the 
use of diplomatic assurances to trusting an alcoholic who says they’re a reformed alcoholic 
without ever having admitted to having had a problem in the first place.
18
 
 It is generally recognised, however, that something more than a simple promise is needed 
before diplomatic assurances can indemnify states’ non-refoulement obligations.19 This has led 
the UK, which has spearheaded the systemic integration of DAs into international law, to argue 
for “enhanced” diplomatic assurances which talk up the role of post-transfer monitoring and 
accountability.
20
 The idea is that signing detailed bilateral memorandums of understanding 
(MOUs) which have provisions for monitoring can both establish a regime which safeguards the 
                                               
14
 Amnesty International, ‘Dangerous Deals’, p. 6  
15
 For example, Algeria hasn’t signed up to the CAT optional protocols which allow monitoring, yet the UK has still 
used DAs to justify return.  
16
 Margaret L. Satterthwaite, ‘Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law’, The George 
Washington Law Review 75, 2007, p. 1387 
17
 Julia Hall, ‘Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture’, Human Rights Watch, 15 April 
2005, p. 3, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/42c3bd400.html, last accessed 20 September 2014. 
18
 http://gordoncampbell.scoop.co.nz/2008/12/08/gordon-campbell-ivs-lord-bingham-of-cornhill/  
19
  see e.g. BB v. SSHD [SC/39/2005], paras. 5-6 in which the UK Special Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
(SAIC) outlines 4 additional “yardsticks” against which to judge the credibility and worth of DAs: “(i) the terms of 
the assurances must be such that, if they are fulfilled, the person returned will not be subjected to treatment contrary 
to Article 3; (ii) the assurances must be given in good faith; (iii) there must be a sound objective basis for believing 
that the assurances will be fulfilled; (iv) fulfilment of the assurances must be capable of being verified.”   
20
 According to an  Amnesty International report, the UK is the “most influential and aggressive” promoter of DAs, 
although they have also been used by: Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden, see “Dangerous Deals: Europe’s reliance on ‘diplomatic assurances’ against torture”, 
April 2010, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR01/012/2010/en/608f128b-9eac-4e2f-b73b-
6d747a8cbaed/eur010122010en.pdf   
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prohibition against torture and get rid of the need for case-by-case assurances from a country. 
The need for such monitoring was recognised by the UN Human Rights Committee in April 
2014 where the US was encouraged to ‘strictly apply the absolute prohibition against 
refoulement’ and ‘continue exercising the utmost care in evaluating diplomatic assurances, and 
refrain from relying on such assurances where it is not in a position to effectively monitor the 
treatment of such persons after their extradition, expulsion, transfer or return to other countries 
and take appropriate remedial action when assurances are not fulfilled’.21 Enhanced DAs have 
governed NATO and US prisoner transfers in Afghanistan.
22
 They have also become a central 
pillar of the counter-piracy regime in the Horn of Africa, governing the transfer of pirates 
captured by international forces for detention and trial in Kenya, Mauritius and the Seychelles.
23
 
More recently, the International Criminal Court used DAs as a way to return three Congolese 
witnesses who had claimed asylum in the Netherlands after given evidence which implicated 
DRC President Joseph Kabila.
24
 The most high profile use of these enhanced diplomatic 
assurances, however, has been in the UK’s attempt to remove Abu Qatada to face trial in Jordan 
for terrorist offences.  
Abu Qatada is a Jordanian national who had been living in the UK since 1993. He was 
indefinitely detained in the UK under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act before 
being released in March 2005 following the so-called Belmarsh judgment of the House of Lords 
and made the subject of a control order.
25
 In August 2005 the UK government attempted to 
deport him for trial in Jordan where he had been convicted in absentia on terrorism related 
charges. Abu Qatada appealed against this on the basis that he would be tortured on his return, 
that he would be unable to receive a fair trial, and that he would face unlawful detention. After 
several rounds of appeals, the House of Lords eventually found that the diplomatic assurances 
received from Jordan offered sufficiently robust protection of Abu Qatada’s human rights.26 
When the question finally came before the European Court of Human Rights it broadly 
concurred with UK’s arguments that the use of diplomatic assurances had the potential to 
effectively protect against Abu Qatada’s risk of torture or unlawful detention, although it 
                                               
21
 Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United States of America, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 
April 2014, para 13. 
22
 Naureen Shah, ‘Promises to Keep: Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture in US Terrorism Transfers’, Human 
Rights Institute, Columbia Law School, p. 164-172, available at: 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/PromisestoKeep.pdf  
23
 Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy 
operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2011), p. 217-220; see also 
‘UNODOC Counter Piracy Programme: Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects’, March 
2013, available at:  http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_11_wv.pdf; 
Alice Priddy and Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘Counterpiracy under International Law’, August 2012, available at 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/academyLecture/Counterpiracy.pdf  
24
 http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ICC-asylum-seekers-return-to-Kinshasa-20140707-2; Dersim Yabasun and 
Mathias Holvoet, ‘Seeking Asylum before the International Criminal Court. Another Challenge for a Court in Need 
of Credibility’, International Criminal Law Review 13:3, July 2013, 725–745; Mathias Holvoet, ‘Former ICC 
Defendant – Ngudjolo – Applies for Asylum in the Netherlands’, 28 March 2013, http://www.ejiltalk.org/former-
icc-defendant-ngudjolo-applies-for-asylum-in-the-netherlands/   
25
 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
26
  RB (Algeria) (FC) and another v SSHD & OO (Jordan) v SSHD [2009] UKHL 10, 18 February 2009 
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ultimately blocked deportation on the basis that the existing agreement could not guarantee a fair 
trial because it failed to establish sufficient safeguards to prevent information obtained through 
torture from being used as evidence in the criminal case. Abu Qatada was eventually deported to 




The impact of this case has essentially been to establish that where diplomatic assurances 
incorporate sufficiently robust monitoring provisions they are capable of protecting the integrity 
of non-refoulement or other human rights obligations. It also established that the practical 
sufficiency of diplomatic assurances in safeguarding the individual’s risk will depend on a range 
of criteria, including the precision of the assurances, the length and strength of the diplomatic 
relationship between the sending and receiving states, and the fact that the assurances were 
concluded at the highest levels of Government. In other words, this judgement is evidence that 
the scope of state’s liability or complicity with torture can be limited by taking reasonable 
measures to ensure an individual’s continued safety. By the same token it also sends a signal to 
that, as Conor McCarthy puts it, ‘there are now few countries, however bad their human rights 
record may be, which are so bad that assurances cannot be sought to enable deportation, subject 
to sufficiently rigorous safeguards being put in place to prevent ill-treatment.’28  
  
Still Empty Promises?  
 
In the wake of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Abu Qatada’s case most in the 
human rights community now privately regard the battle over the legality of diplomatic 
assurances as a battle lost. It is accepted that diplomatic assurances, at least in an enhanced form, 
are now a fixed part of the policymaker’s toolbox.29 They have, however, continued to express 
scepticism about their capacity to effectively ringfence human rights. There have been four main 
areas of concern which suggest that, even though there is now a firmer jurisprudential basis for 
their use, the threshold diplomatic assurances would have to meet before they can be used are 
regarded by human rights advocates as practically unattainable in the vast majority of cases.  
First, even with the use of enhanced diplomatic assurances, the arrangements in place for 
monitoring are more ad hoc than the rhetoric might suggest. One human rights NGO, for 
example, raised concerns over the feasibility of active monitoring of DAs by the UK only to be 
told by the Courts that they were sure any breaches of the DA would be brought to the FCO’s 
                                               
27
 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 30 July 2013, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-mutual-legal-assistance-between-the-uk-and-jordan; it bears 
mentioning that this is the first and only time that DAs have been given in the form of a treaty.  
28
 Conor McCarthy, ‘Diplomatic Assurances, Torture and Extradition: The Case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the 
United Kingdom’, 18 January 2012 http://www.ejiltalk.org/diplomatic-assurances-torture-and-extradition-the-case-
of-othman-abu-qatada-v-the-united-kingdom/   
29
  see e.g. Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers, January 2011, p. 33-35, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97972/review-findings-and-rec.pdf   
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attention by the NGO in question.
30
 Lord Mance, of the UK Supreme Court, has similarly 
suggested that the public scrutiny by human rights groups and the media surrounding high profile 
DA cases provides additional credibility to a receiving government's assurances.
31
 The 
implication that human rights organisations or the media are effective safeguards for DAs vastly 
overestimates the resources and access that these organisations have in states like Jordan, 
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Egypt or the DRC.
32
 It also ignores the worries over the willingness of 
individuals subject to DAs to report abuses because of the functional difficulty with protecting 
anonymity and preventing reprisals against the individual or their families.
33
 Effective 
monitoring requires unimpeded unlimited unannounced access to all detainees in all detention 
centres precisely because torture happens in secret, in a climate of impunity and deniability. 
A second ongoing difficulty concerns the objectivity of the monitoring body itself. There 
are useful lessons from the UK government’s MoU with Libya under Qaddafi. The reason this 
wasn’t used while Qaddafi was in power was because the UK Court of Appeal stepped in, 
judging that the claims to independence and objectivity were undermined by the fact that his son, 
Saif al-Islam, served as chair of the monitoring body.
34
 The worry going forward is that other 
states will get smart and learn to bury any conflict of interest far deeper. Ethiopia seems to have 
done exactly this prior to signing a MoU with the UK in December 2008. The “independent” 
monitoring body empowered in this agreement was the government-sponsored Ethiopian Human 
Rights Commission. The alternatives available were limited, however, due to the Ethiopian 
government’s crackdown on civil society, in which it closed essentially all independent NGOs. 
As Tom Porteous, London director of Human Rights Watch, argued at the time: ‘Expecting an 
Ethiopian government-sponsored commission to monitor torture cases is farcical, especially 
when Ethiopia is fast becoming one of the most inhospitable places in the world for independent 
human rights investigation.’35  
A third issue is the continued potential for misalignment between how each side views 
the promises agreed to. The majority of DAs have not been legally binding, leading Juan Mendez 
and Ben Emmerson – respectively the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Counter-
terrorism and Human Rights – to ask why states with a history of violating their binding 
international legal obligations should be trusted to comply with non-binding assurances.
36
 The 
recent history of the Abu Qatada case suggests a further worry that even where states have 
signed a binding agreement in good faith, domestic courts will not always interpret the standing 
of international legal obligations in the way the architects of the agreement intended. The 
assurances governing the transfer of Abu Qatada to Jordan did have a binding legal status and 
                                               
30
 U & Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSAIC (25 January 2013), para 42.  
31
 http://www.asil.org/blogs/approach-courts-foreign-affairs-and-national-security  
32
 See e.g. Manfred Nowak, ‘Fact-Finding on Torture and Ill-Treatment and Conditions of Detention’, 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 1:1, March 2009, pp. 101-119. 
33
 http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/17/uk-ethiopian-assurances-no-guarantee-against-torture  
34
 DD & AS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKSIAC 42/2005 (27 April 2007)  
35






explicitly prevented the information obtained through torture from being used as evidence.
37
 In 
practice, however, the Jordanian court found  that because evidence obtained through torture had 
already been admitted in a previous linked case, domestic jurisprudence required that this 
torture-tainted information be admitted as evidence against Qatada. Adam Coogle of Human 
Rights Watch argues that ‘the fact that the confession was admitted as evidence at all shows just 
how worthless the treaty really was. It’s clear that “diplomatic assurances” from countries with 
poor records on torture aren’t worth the paper they’re written on.’38 Outside of the judicial 
context there is likely to be even more room for competing interpretations of cooperative 
agreements. For example, Pervez Musharraf has made clear that his standing assumption while 
in power was that underlying the anti-torture posture of Western allies was a clear tacit approval 
for torture, a kind of “don’t ask don’t tell” interrogation policy.39 The secrecy which surrounds 
intelligence cooperation and national security deportations further adds to the potential for the 
effective operation DAs to be corrupted.
40
 
Finally, the capacity of diplomatic assurances to manage the conflict between human 
rights and security relies on confidence in the existence of a strong and stable diplomatic 
relationship, both as a pre-requisite for trusting partner countries and as something which can be 
leveraged as a punishment for failing to uphold DAs. There are problems with both of these 
claims. The unexpected events of the Arab Spring and its aftermath in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq 
and Yemen highlight the degree to which political stability – hence trustworthiness – can be a 
chimera. More than that, diplomatic assurances negotiated with the old regime can become 
politically toxic in attempts to engage the new regime.
41
 When former friends become enemies, 
and vice versa, a carefully negotiated agreement can quickly become meaningless. Short of 
threatening forcible intervention, there are limited ways to remedy the possibility that an 
individual will be tortured in these cases. Similarly, there is little basis for thinking that states 
would be willing to endanger a valuable diplomatic relationship in order to secure or punish 
violations of DAs, precisely because of the forward looking nature of intelligence gathering.
42
 
The fact that an ally has broken a promise and violated an agreement may be of deep concern but 
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The above challenges to the use of diplomatic assurances focus on the continued operational 
difficulties of using DAs as an effective way to remedy the relationship between human rights 
and national security imperatives where there is a persistent possibility of an individual being 
tortured. It is also possible, however, to couch the opposition to DAs in terms of a deeper set of 
concerns over the damage the use of diplomatic assurances can do to the broader anti-torture 
regime, regardless of how stringent the case-by-case risk assessment or monitoring mechanisms 
might be. Non-refoulement is one of the preventative mechanisms detailed in the Convention 
Against Torture, alongside, inter alia, the exclusionary rule which prevents the use of evidence 
obtained from torture from being used in criminal proceedings (Article 15), the obligation to 
investigate torture (Article 12-13) and the obligation to prevent, prosecute and punish torture 
(Article 4-9). The worry here is that diplomatic assurances are not merely empty promises that 
enable torture, they’re empty promises that erode the global anti-torture regime.  
            The war on terror has seen extraordinary rendition, targeted killing and complicity with 
torture all presented as legal and legitimate. This claim to legality and legitimacy has helped 
frame the debate over the legacy or effect of the war on terror on fundamental human rights. Tim 
Dunne argues, for instance, that fundamental human rights were plunged into crisis after 9/11 
precisely because it became impossible to ignore the existence of a two-tier standard of 
legitimacy in international society, centred around the US belief in its own exceptional standing, 
something which was at no point more evident than in the attempt to recast torture or “enhanced 
interrogation” as permissible.44  Jason Ralph has argued that the counterterrorism narrative was 
driven less by the “blanket exceptionalism” which characterised the earliest responses to 9/11 
than by the later practice of “spatial exceptionalism”, in which the claims to exceptional 
authority were more precisely tied to claims about the limits of international law’s jurisdiction.45 
One example of this was the spurious argument that the legal obligations contained in the 
Convention Against Torture only applied to activities within the geographical United States, and 
didn’t cover extra-territorial practices, including prisoner transfers and interrogations in third 
party states. In other words, it wasn’t just the scale of the terrorist threat which justified 
exceptional measures but the existence of exceptional spaces in which fundamental human rights 
protections were argued not to apply. Either way, in leveraging its position to defend the use of 
torture in exceptional circumstances or spaces, the US became – wittingly or not – an illiberal 
norm entrepreneur. By turning what had been the ultimate moral stigma into a practice the merits 
of which were, at least, up for debate, Bush-era officials started the prohibition against torture on 
what Ryder McKeown calls a ‘death cycle’.46 It was not just that the US sanctioned torture, but 
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that the torture debates have made it legitimate to think that torture could be a reasonable and 
responsible policy choice in exceptional circumstances.
47
 
Are Western governments really responsible for “breaking” the anti-torture norm? 
McKeown himself stops short of suggesting that the international prohibition is in terminal 
decline, arguing that a public recommitment to the absolute status of the norm could avert 
regress outside of US domestic society. His account reflects what seems to be the standing 
assumption that re-committing to an “inclusionary” view of human rights and international law 
which acknowledges that the treatment of terrorist suspects is governed by the existing 
international legal framework is an effective strategy for countering the damage caused by a 
practice of exceptionalism.
48
 When understood as part of a strategy for remedying 
exceptionalism DAs become a solution to the problem of norm regress.  
Another reason this constructivist narrative can be used to justify diplomatic assurances is 
because they seem to represent a way of generating better norm internalization than the existing 
anti-torture regime has managed. Despite beginning as a box ticking exercise, the ratification of 
human rights treaties and institutions has often had an unintended impact on domestic politics in 
illiberal states because they help mobilize domestic pressure groups
49
, legitimize international 
calls for improved norm compliance
50
, or become functional tools for proving the credibility of 
elite actors.
51
 Another spin on this constructivist theme is that because DAs require both a high-
level buy-in on the institutional guarantees needed to ringfence human rights protections and 
because there would be serious consequences to reneging on the agreement, DAs put Western 
foreign policy actors into a better position to get traction on human rights then they have 
traditionally had.
52
 In other words, using DAs to force better human rights compliance in a 
limited number cases has the potential, over time, to generate better take-up of the anti-torture 
norm. 
There are four problems with this positive spin on DAs as a tool for bracketing off a 
damaging legacy of exceptionalism. These problems suggest that the shadow of illegality cast by 
the war on terror is darker and wider than states have been willing to admit. First, the protections 
granted by DAs are targeted at named individuals and, beyond reiterating the human rights 
commitments already enshrined in the core human rights treaties, do not provide the sort of 
actionable, universal rights claims that domestic pressure groups mobilize around. Mobilizing 
around the defence of a terrorist’s rights is also an entirely different prospect from mobilizing 
around a state’s international treaty obligations, as is evident from the US public’s muted 
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reaction to the torture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed.
53
 Third, scholars have recently pointed out 
that constructivist arguments tend to suffer from a ‘good norm bias’, ignoring the potential for 
constructivist processes to entrench alternative or ‘bad’ norms, particularly where there is a 
rhetorical convergence or ‘coalition of norm challengers’.54 DAs seem well placed to entrench 
the norm that Western governments don’t care about incidents of torture that lack an 
international dimension.
55 
For states without the constitutional checks of the liberal constitutional 
orders, for states with a history of permitting torture, and for states which continue to face 
“exceptional” domestic security threats, the past justification of torture is likely to have created a 
dangerous and ongoing precedent. Amnesty International has recently suggested that the global 
legacy of the War on Terror is that torture over the past 5 years has become ‘disturbingly 
widespread’, with incidents catalogued in 141 countries, including 79 of the 155 signatories of 
the UN Convention Against Torture.
56
 Finally, focusing on the health of the core prohibition 
against torture ignores the damage done to the broader anti-torture regime. The principle of non-
refoulement is a component part of the prevention of torture, yet constructivist arguments tend to 
disaggregate questions about the standing of the core prohibition on torture from questions about 
the scope or operation of non-refoulement and the constellation of related preventive 
obligations.
57
 In evaluating the long term impact, at least as important as the direct violations of 
the core prohibition sanctioned implicitly or explicitly by Western governments are the varying 
forms of participation and support provided by 54 countries around the world.
58
 Part of that 
support has been facilitated by the innovate use of diplomatic assurances.   
It is the potential diplomatic assurances have to dismantle the integrated anti-torture 
regime which has become arguably the most pressing issue for human rights advocates. In her 
role as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour argued that by replacing the 
current regime which entitles all prisoners to equal human rights protections with a regime which 
ignores systemic torture and only seeks to protect a select few prisoners DAs ‘threaten to empty 
international human rights law of its content’.59 There are some recent signs that this worry is 
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justified. Australia has increasingly relied on DAs to justify mass returns of asylum seekers to 
Papua New Guinea, ignoring the need to judge the risk of torture on a case-by-case basis. Russia 
has used DAs as cover for returns to Uzbekistan, despite the lack of effective monitoring and 
evidence of torture. Similarly, in June 2012 the Committee against Torture found that the use of 
DAs by Uzbekistan to justify extraditing 28 men to Kazakhstan was in breach of the CAT Article 
3 prohibition against torture, warning that the existence of diplomatic assurances ‘cannot be used 
as an instrument to avoid the application of the principle of non-refoulement’.60  
 These uses of diplomatic assurances may not mirror the enhanced DAs argued for by the 
UK – but that becomes precisely the point when considering the normative impact of changing 
or watering down the principle of non-refoulement. Enshrining diplomatic assurances into 
international law means that all states – not just Western liberal states – are able to claim a 
greater discretionary entitlement with regard to managing the tension between human rights and 
security.
61
 In states without a history of respect for human rights or lacking strong judicial review 
procedures it should be no surprise if the tools available are used either as a new form of cover 
for ongoing human rights violations.  
  
 Conclusion: Gaming the anti-torture regime  
  
Debates over the relationship between human rights and counterterrorism have tended to be 
overshadowed by the focus on extraordinary rendition by the CIA, on “enhanced interrogation” 
or torture, on indefinite detention and targeted killings, on practices which have often lacked 
even the pretence of legality. As policymakers have sought to draw a line under the Bush-era, 
they have been forced to make a better case for how to operationalise the competing 
requirements of human rights and national security.  
Enhanced diplomatic assurances have quickly become one of the key mechanisms for 
achieving this.
62
 Although historically a primarily European tool, diplomatic assurances are now 
being used on an increasingly global scale. The US, for example, relied on this mechanism to 
backstop the legality of the US transfer of Djamel Saiid Ali Ameziane and Bensayah Belkecem 
from Guantanamo to Algeria in December 2010. This is to say that the issues surrounding the 
use of DAs are likely to arise again and again as policymakers look to end indefinite detention in 
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; as a result of the strategic pressure for counterterrorism 
partnerships with human rights abusers
64
; as governments look for new ways to secure their 
borders against transnational threats and home-grown terrorism; and because of the difficulties 
surrounding criminal trials for terrorists. DAs have become a crucial mechanism for outsourcing 
the responsibility for releasing, detaining, monitoring or prosecuting terrorists to less liberal 
countries, bypassing fraught debates over how to deal with suspected terrorists within the 
constraints imposed by a commitment to human rights. What’s more, they now have a clear 
foothold in international law.  
States have managed to establish diplomatic assurances as part of the policymakers 
toolbox by emphasising the need for innovative measures which allow policymakers to strike a 
more workable balance between human rights and national security commitments and place 
limits on the scope of their liability under the anti-torture regime. This challenges the idea that 
Obama’s counterterrorism strategy is defined by continuity with the values, assumptions and 
attitudes of the Bush-era.
65
 If the British experience is any guide, the transition to a law-
enforcement framework is being framed by a more nuanced “pragmatic” approach towards 
fundamental human rights in which the rules and responsibilities of international law – 
particularly where national security is implicated – are interpreted with reference to their policy 
fit.
66
 This contrasts with the more orthodox positivist approach which takes seriously the need to 
insulate international law, as far as possible, from subjective political judgements.
67
 The 
pragmatic project is to take back the responsibility for developing international law from those 
advocates and institutions of international law who have conspired to graft a more settled, fixed 
authority onto many fundamental human rights norms than should rightfully be accepted. 
Crucially, such an  approach does not entrench a necessary bias against human rights in the way 
that the exceptionalism narrative did. There is an absolute commitment both to obey international 
law where there is a clear sense of the obligations to be followed and to build up the 
effectiveness of the international legal order. The simple premise is that by failing to show some 
flexibility in the face of the new challenges created by transnational terrorism human rights 
advocates have allowed the norms to become ‘devalued’ and in need of fixing through 
administrative measures such as DAs.
68
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Human rights advocates can and do accept the need to develop procedures which allow 
for more effective application of human rights norms to counterterrorism operations.
69
 But their 
“hard-earned wisdom” from the previous 14 years has been that powerful states will use their 
discretionary powers to “game” the human rights system in a way which establishes a systemic 
bias in favour of security imperatives and against the protection of individual rights. In the 2010 
report, ‘Promises to Keep’, Naureen Shah noted that ‘the US maintains broad secrecy about its 
current practice while insisting that others trust it to respect the law and do the right thing’, 
suggesting that the controversy surrounding diplomatic assurances centres on whether the US 
can be trusted to uphold the spirit of the law, rather than trying to construct self-serving 
exceptions.
70
 This is only partly true. The controversy is also driven by the global legacy of past 
abuses. As a result, integrating the commitment to prevent torture into counterterrorism strategy 
becomes about more than protecting the individual subject or the actions of any one state; it also 
becomes about the progressive responsibilities states have for fixing the damage they’ve done to 
the anti-torture regime – and whether the architects of past abuses can be trusted to remedy and 
develop the law in a way that strengthens rather than undermines the anti-torture regime.
71
 
Evaluating the use of diplomatic assurances as a tool for integrating human rights and 
counterterrorism cannot be sequestered from debates over the legacy of the war on terror, 
particularly the damage done to the global anti-torture regime.  
One of the central insights from international relations scholars working on the concept 
of trust has been that alongside strategic forms of trust – deciding, for example, whether a 
receiving state can be trusted to abide by the substance of diplomatic assurance – is a generalized 
form of social trust.
72
 In this guise, trust becomes the red thread running through the liberal 
social contract tradition;
73
 it is the existence of a normative disposition to trust which allows 
rulers to rule without having to rely on fear and punishment or, on the flip side, be required to 
hold public referenda prior to every decision. The secrecy which surrounds counter-terrorism 
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work heightens the role that trust plays in enabling the exercise of political authority.
74
 In 
eschewing exceptionalism and committing to grapple with the practical challenge of managing 
the tensions between security and human rights, policymakers have been forced to confront their 
role as trustees of the values and principles which define the domestic constitutional order. 
However, acknowledging the need to uphold human rights while countering terrorism also 
demands thinking beyond this narrow domestic context and taking the global scope of 
counterterrorism seriously; it is states’ roles as trustees of a global social contract or constitution, 
of which the anti-torture norm is a fundamental part, which is most at issue in the current round 
of the torture debates. To put this another way, responding effectively to the trade-offs created by 
the existence of the overlapping values of security and human rights, whether that be through 
diplomatic assurances or some other mechanism, entails engaging with how this will shape the 
future practices of all states, liberal and illiberal alike.
75
  
So long as policymakers remain evasive about their past betrayal of trust – about the 
depth of their complicity, about the effectiveness of monitoring regimes in preventing human 
rights violations, about the regressive global legacy of the war on terror – reclaiming the trust 
required to change and, perhaps, improve the existing fit between human rights and security will 
be a fractious affair.
76
 This dredging up of past abuses is frustrating for security actors and 
policymakers who take seriously their (re)commitment to fundamental human rights and want to 
draw a line under past practices.
77
 And yet part of this frustration stems from a failure to 
understand or acknowledge that human rights advocates are not attempting to refight past battles 
or pick at old wounds but are now motivated by a new set of worries. These worries centre not 
on whether policymakers can be trusted to follow international human rights law but on whether, 
given the legacy of the war on terror, they can be trusted to remedy and develop the law in a way 
that strengthens rather than undermines the global anti-torture regime. This, this loss of trust in 
the capacity to progressively develop the rules, is what happens when a gamekeeper turns 
poacher.   
                                               
74
 See especially Sawers, 2010. 
75
 For an interesting illustration of this see especially Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘The Choice of Law Against 
Terrorism’, Journal of National Security Law and Policy, 4:2, August 2010, p. 343-367. 
76
 On the relationship between betrayal and trust see especially Michel, ‘Time to get emotional’, pp. 881-882. 
77
 See Obama’s response to the US Senate report into CIA torture: ‘Rather than another reason to refight old 
arguments, I hope that today’s report can help us leave these techniques where they belong – in the past’, December 
2014, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/09/statement-president-report-senate-
select-committee-intelligence  
